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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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Abstract 
The current Enterprise Requirements and Acquisition Model, a discrete event simulation of 
the major tasks and decisions within the DoD acquisition system, identifies several what-if 
intervention strategies to improve program completion time. However, processes that 
contribute to the program acquisition completion time were not explicitly identified. This 
research seeks to determine the acquisition processes that contribute significantly to the time 
a program reaches Milestone (MS) B and provide interventions to improve program 
completion time. In order to solve this problem, this research uses critical path analysis to 
determine the bottleneck activities in the Pre-MS B processes using additional simulation 
analysis. Results show that the systems engineering processes are the bottleneck activities 
in Pre-MS B acquisition stage. Furthermore, this research then examines the effect of these 
processes by varying the mean completion times and having them occur earlier in the 
acquisition process. Potential policies are formulated from the results to further reduce 
program acquisition completion time. 
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Introduction 
A large number of Department of Defense (DoD) projects are being completed 
behind schedule and over-budget (Schwartz, 2010). To support this claim, a Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report released in 2009 stated that for the DoD’s 2008 portfolio, 
on average a program faced a 22-month delay and exceeded the original budget (Sullivan et 
al., 2009). Generally, total cost growth of 44% has been consistent over the past few 
decades with a recent assessment by RAND (Arena et al., 2006). Hence, potential 
intervention strategies and policies to improve the acquisition processes would be 
worthwhile. On the other hand, since the end-to-end DoD acquisition process is a large, 
complex, socio-technological system, it is difficult to analyze and determine which processes 
or factors affect performance metrics like time, cost, and resource utilization. The current 
DoD acquisition system, which is composed of three separate and distinct processes—the 
Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS), the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting & Execution (PPBE) process, and the formal acquisition development system 
outlined by the DoD 5000 series of instructions—does not exist in a static environment. The 
system is constantly being adjusted, either through policy changes or statute (CJCS, 2012; 
Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009; OUSD[AT&L], 2008). Hence, other viable 
analysis methodologies must be utilized to fully comprehend this complex system. 
In 2009, a discrete event simulation (DES) model called the Enterprise Requirements 
and Acquisition Model (ERAM) was created by Wirthlin (2009). This model was created to 
simulate the actual acquisition processes of the DoD, using the Air Force implementation of 
acquisition processes as the basis of the model, in order to provide further insight and 
understanding of the complex system’s behavior. Furthermore, ERAM has benefited from 
additional research since the original 2009 Wirthlin version (Leach & Searle, 2011; 
Montgomery, 2012). These new versions have added additional functionality and options for 
model users to manipulate (Wirthlin, Houston, & Madachy, 2011). According to the ERAM 
model, during the acquisition process, approximately 80% of the time, a program was 
undergoing parallel processes when it is in the acquisition system. It was also observed that 
one of the main portions of the model during which these parallel processes take place are 
within the Pre-Milestone B (Pre-MS B) stage. However, Wirthlin’s research did not identify 
the significant processes that affect the total program time for a project to reach MS B.  
Against this background, this research addressed these limitations and issues by 
additional simulation and statistical analysis on the ERAM Arena version of the model. The 
end goal of this research was to determine the bottleneck of the Pre-MS B processes, 
investigate interventions to alleviate the bottleneck, and translate them into implementable 
policy changes. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The Review of Literature 
section provides an overview of the current literature on bottleneck analysis and the ERAM 
model. The Simulation Analysis Methodology section presents the simulation analysis 
methodology performed, while the Results and Discussions section shows the results of the 
analysis. Finally, the Conclusions section presents the conclusions of this research as well 
as viable intervention policies for reducing the time a program takes to reach MS B. 
Review of Literature 
The ERAM Model 
The ERAM simulation model extends from the generation of capability requirements 
in the JCIDS process to MS C, the review before the production stage begins. Additionally, 
the ERAM is abstracted at a very high level (Wirthlin, 2009). This high level of abstraction 
allows overall system performance to be more easily studied. For each replication, ERAM 
produces schedule time for programs that reach MS C. Although cost is not measured, it 
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was found that cost overruns were closely related to schedule overruns (Wirthlin, 2009). The 
validation and verification of ERAM included hand modeling, iterations of correction from 
feedback of experts in all three systems that comprise the entire acquisition system, and 
comparison of schedule and budget information from the DAMIR and SMART databases to 
distributions of the schedule time of model-generated data (Wirthlin, 2009). 
The original version of ERAM was created in Arena Simulation software; however, it 
was translated into an ExtendSim version (ERAM 1.0) to serve as a schedule and success 
estimation tool of space programs for the Concept Design Center of Aerospace Corporation 
(Leach & Searle, 2011). Leach and Searle further modified the model introducing ERAM 1.1 
to 2.1 by correcting discrepancies between the Arena and ExtendSim models, adding user-
controlled variables, incorporating space-acquisition specific elements, and updating the 
model to include policy in the newly released DoDI 5000.02 document. Montgomery (2012) 
continued developing the model in order to add the rapid acquisition process and include 
ACAT II/III programs. A summary of the versions of the ERAM is presented in Table 1. 




Wirthlin (2009) ERAM 1.0 Baseline Translation from Arena to ExtendSim 
Leach and Searle 
(2011) 
ERAM 1.1 Updates by the Aerospace Design Team and Served as new baseline model 
ERAM 1.2 Implemented new DoD 5000.02 policies 
ERAM 2.0 Incorporated the global variables that modify acquisition capabilities  
ERAM 2.1 Incorporated the JCIDS review process 
Montgomery (2012) ERAM 2.2 Added more capabilities for ACAT 2/3 and Rapid Acquisition Process 
Since the ExtendSim version of ERAM was designed with the purpose of allowing 
Aerospace Corporation to create estimates of the schedule and success of a particular 
project, it has a distinctly different scope and utility from the Arena model of ERAM. The 
Arena model allows the user to view the behavior of the overall portfolio while the 
ExtendSim version allows the user to investigate a specific program. For example, while the 
ExtendSim requires the user to select a specific ACAT level for the program being tested, 
the Arena version assigns ACAT levels based on the distribution of programs observed in 
the actual acquisition system. While the ExtendSim version of ERAM was designed with the 
intention of allowing the user to perform what-if scenarios, as far as the researcher is 
concerned, no literature of the evaluation of possible intervention strategies using the 
ExtendSim version of ERAM has been published. In his dissertation, Wirthlin investigated 
the effect of 20 interventions on the effect of end-to-end acquisition time in the Arena 
version. When all 20 interventions were implemented, a 20% reduction in end-to-end 
acquisition time was achieved. However, more interventions can be developed to further 
study and improve the DoD end-to-end acquisition process.  
Critical Path Analysis 
To the best of our knowledge, no literature has attempted to identify the critical path 
of the acquisition process (Monaco & White, 2005). Although long cycle times continue to 
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plague DoD acquisition programs, relatively few studies have focused on identifying 
significant processes that dictate program cycle time. Despite the Packard Commission’s 
assertion that schedule drives costs, most studies and policy changes have focused on cost 
reduction rather than reducing cycle time (Al-Harbi, 2001; McNutt, 1999). Drezner and Smith 
(1990) performed a statistical analysis of 10 programs in order to hypothesize factors that 
affect the original plan and program deviation. A study performed by Tyson, Nelson, Om, 
and Palmer (1989) examined schedule variance and its causes. The study found that 
prototyping, sole-source procurement, fixed-priced contracts, and multiyear procurement 
reduced schedule variance. The study also found that programs awarded through full and 
open competition experience more schedule growth than those programs that did not. 
Another possible schedule driver is presented by Brown, Flowe, and Hamel (2007). Brown 
et al. compared the schedule quality of joint and single-system programs. From this study it 
was found that joint system programs have significantly more schedule breaches; however, 
the research did not identify the root cause of this difference (Brown et al., 2007). 
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, there exists no research that has been 
conducted that isolates and identifies bottleneck activities and its effect on the program 
completion time throughout the DoD acquisition process. Hence, intervention strategies to 
be developed must be focused on addressing bottleneck issues to obtain maximum 
improvement of the end-to-end DoD acquisition process.  
Simulation Analysis Methodology 
This section describes the analysis performed to identify bottleneck operations within 
the Pre-MS B stage. After identifying bottleneck operations, intervention strategies were also 
formulated in this section to reduce total program completion time. Hence, this research was 
performed in two phases. A brief description of these phases is presented as follows: 
 The first phase performed a critical path analysis on the Pre-MS B activities to 
identify a bottleneck (see the Identification of Bottleneck Activities subsection).  
 The second phase focused on investigating the effect of reducing the process 
times of the identified bottleneck activities from Phase 1 and determining the 
effect of allowing them to be executed earlier in the process (see the Design of 
Pre-MS B Bottleneck Interventions subsection).  
Identification of Bottleneck Activities 
In order to perform critical path analysis, the Pre-MS B section was mapped by hand 
to assist in visualization of the complex network of separation and batches in the acquisition 
system. The processes between each Separate and Batch method were left out for 
simplicity and ease of interpretation. The section or line segment between any two nodes 
was labeled. Figure 1 shows the mapped version of the Pre-MS B activities and Table 2 
shows the activities associated with each section. 
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 Pre-MS B Flowchart 
 
 List of Activities in the Pre-MS B Flowchart 
Section Description of Activities 
1 Requirements generation: KPP Development, high performance team work, 
etc. 
2 RFP release, contract awarding 
3 Waiting period for start of contract 
4-6 Cost estimates (contractor, program office, and independent) 
7 Affordability assessment 
8 Set acquisition program baseline 
9-10 No processes 
11 Prepare and conduct acquisition panels 
12 Early Systems Engineering (SE) activities: EOA, developmental testing, 
SRR, etc. 
13 Acquisition planning activities 
14 Draft RFP 
15 RFP coordination 
16 Source selection plans 
Several Assign and Record modules were added to the Arena model in order to 
determine the time to complete each segment. Next, a trial of 3,000 runs was performed in 
Arena, and the times for each segment were collected. A spreadsheet was then used to 
analyze results and to determine the time of every possible path from the beginning of the 
Pre-MS B activities to the MS B decision. The path that took the longest amount of time was 
deemed as the critical path. By comparing segments in the longest paths to the sections 
found in shorter paths, the bottleneck activities for the Pre-MS B processes were identified. 
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Design of Pre-MS B Bottleneck Interventions 
In order to improve the performance and alleviate the delay caused by this 
bottleneck, two intervention strategies were developed and tested in ERAM. The first 
intervention performed was to test the effect of decreasing the process time for all 
bottleneck activities. In order to test the effect of reducing total process time, the minimum, 
maximum, and mode for these activities was reduced by a fixed percentage. A paired t-test 
was then performed to compare each trial to the baseline at 95% confidence level. The 
reduction by using a fixed percentage was performed until a statistically significant change 
was obtained. Furthermore, the second intervention was a sensitivity analysis to determine 
the effect of allowing the bottleneck to be performed earlier in the Pre-MS B process to 
determine its effect on the total process time. The results of these interventions are 
illustrated in the next section.  
Results and Discussions 
This section presents the results of both simulation analysis phases performed on 
the ERAM Arena model. Specifically, the Pre-MS B Critical Path Analysis Results 
subsection presents the results of the identification of the critical path and bottleneck 
activities. Additionally, the Additional Pre-MS B Bottleneck Interventions subsection shows 
the results of the interventions performed on the bottleneck analysis to improve program 
completion time.  
Pre-MS B Critical Path Analysis Results 
During the critical path analysis, times for all 11 paths through the system were 
calculated. The paths were labeled by letters. Each path was composed of segments. A 
subset of the paths and their corresponding activities is shown in Table 3. 
 List of Paths and Segments for Pre-MS B 
Path Name Corresponding Segments From Figure 1 
A 1 
B 2, 12, 14, 16, 10, 11 
C 2, 12, 14, 15, 10, 11 
D 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11 
E 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11 
F 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 11 
G 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 
H 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11 
I 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 
J 2, 3, 13, 14, 15, 10, 11 
K 2, 3, 13, 14, 16, 10, 11 
As seen from the Table 3, paths B and C heavily overlap while path A has no overlap 
with any other path. From the total time for each path, the longest was deemed the critical 
path. The second longest and third longest paths were also determined. A subset of this 
data can be seen in Table 4. 
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 Length of Longest Paths to MS B 
Run Percentage 







Runs as Third 
Longest Path 
Percentage of Runs 
in the Top Three 
Longest Path 
 
A 45 8.75 42.5 96.25 
B 43.75 38.75 7.5 90.00 
C 6.25 38.75 31.25 76.25 
D 3.75 8.75 8.75 21.25 
F 0 2.5 5 7.5 
J 0 1.25 1.25 2.50 
K 1.25 1.25 3.75 6.25 
E, G, H, I 0 0 0 0 
As can be observed in Table 4, the critical path was most often A, B, and C. In 
approximately 95% of the trials, either A, B, or C composed the critical path. Specifically, 
50% of the time path B or C was the critical path, and 45% of the time path A was the critical 
path. We note that path B and C have significant overlap; therefore, they are considered as 
a single path, path B/C. Since the critical path was very evenly split between path A and 
path B/C, it can be deduced that a Pre-MS B process common to both of paths would be the 
bottleneck of the process.  
In examining the ERAM, it can be gleaned that there was some interaction between 
path A and path B/C. One of the last modules of path A was a hold module called “Wait for 
EOA completion.” A screenshot of this module can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
 Wait for EOA Completion Screenshot 
As seen in Figure 2, path A must wait for the EOA to be complete before the path 
can finish. A second communication occurs between the two paths. In order for the SE 
activities, like the EOA, to occur, the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) must be 
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complete. The hold model called “Wait for T&E start” facilitates this communication and can 
be seen in Figure 3. 
 
 Wait for T&E start Screenshot 
However, we note that this hold module also waits for the 75% of the contract length 
to elapse. At the default settings, the KPPs will always be completed in less than 75% of the 
contract length. Therefore, at the default settings, this hold does not serve as 
communication between the paths. 
Since the completion of the EOA was the only communication between the two 
critical paths, the SE activities that begin before the EOA completion was determined to be 
the bottleneck of the Pre-MS B activities. If this bottleneck activity were removed, the time to 
MS B would be reduced by an average of 6.8%. 
Additional Pre-MS B Bottleneck Interventions 
Table 5 summarizes the results of the t-tests performed for when the process time 
for MS B system engineering activities was reduced. The tables show a subset of trials 
corresponding to a reduction in process times by 0%, 20%, 35%, or 50%. These settings 
were selected to show the sensitivity of the model to various degrees of process time 
reduction. From these simulation analyses, the mean (ߤ௜೟೓%) and standard deviation of the 
total completion time for each trial were calculated. These calculated means were compared 
to the mean of the baseline setting (ߤ௕௔௦௘) in the default settings, or 0% process time 
reduction. The null hypothesis for the t-tests is ܪ଴: ߤ௕௔௦௘ ൌ ߤ௜೟೓% which corresponds to a 
failure to reject the claim that the baseline and the ݅௧௛	percentage are similar and alternative 
hypothesis	ܪଵ: ߤ௕௔௦௘ ് ߤ௜೟೓% if there is significant difference. 
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 Summary of t-Test Results of Process Time Reduction for SE Activities 
 % Reduction of Process Time 
0% 
(Baseline) 
20% 35% 50% 














P-Value  0.281 0.109 0.046 
Conclusion  Fail to Reject 
H0 




As seen in Table 5, it is evident that when the process time for SE activities was 
decreased by less than 50%, there will not be a statistically significant decrease in the time 
to MS B. However, when the process times for SE activities are reduced by more than 
approximately 50%, the model exhibits a statistically significant decrease in time to MS B. 
Based on the identified bottleneck, which was the SE activities, a second intervention 
was developed. Specifically a sensitivity analysis was done to test the effect of allowing the 
bottleneck activities to occur earlier in the contract. This was implemented by adjusting the 
module called “Begin Testing PreB,” which can be seen in Figure 4. 
 
 Begin Testing PreB Screenshot 
The “Begin Testing PreB” module is a Decide module that, when set to true, triggers 
the beginning of the SE activities. The original criteria for the decide module, as verified and 
validated by Wirthlin when creating the ERAM model, was that 75% of the contract length 
must pass before these activities can occur. During this research, this percent was 
decreased to simulate the SE activities occurring sooner and more resources being applied 
at the beginning of the contract.  
In addition, to allow SE tasks to begin sooner, the KPPs must be completed sooner 
in the process as their completion is also needed to trigger the start of the SE tasks. A more 
complete discussion of this interaction can be found in the Pre-MS B Critical Path Analysis 
Results subsection. The process time of the KPP development was reduced in order for the 
KPPs to be completed in a manner that does not delay the SE activities. A paired t-test was 
then performed to compare each trial to the baseline at 95% confidence level. 
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Tables 6 and Table 7 summarize the results of the t-tests performed for allowing Pre-
MS B contractor activities to occur earlier in the contract. Specifically, Table 6 shows the 
effect of allowing the SE activities to occur earlier in the contract when the KPPs generation 
process time was not decreased, and Table 7 shows the effect of allowing the SE activities 
to occur earlier in the contract in conjunction with the KPPs generation process performing 
faster. Table 6 shows a subset of trials corresponding to the SE activity starting when 75%, 
50%, 33%, or 25% of the contract has elapsed. Table 7 shows a subset of trials 
corresponding to the SE activity starting when 75%, 65%, 60%, or 55% of the contract has 
elapsed.    
These settings were selected to show the sensitivity of the model to various start 
times of SE activities. From these simulations, the mean (ߤ௜೟೓%) and standard deviation of 
the total MS B completion time for each trial were calculated. These calculated means were 
compared to the mean of the baseline setting (ߤ௕௔௦௘) in the default settings, or starting after 
75% of the contract has elapsed. The null hypothesis for the t-tests is ܪ଴: ߤ௕௔௦௘ ൌ ߤ௜೟೓% 
which corresponds to a failure to reject the claim that the baseline and the ݅௧௛	percentage of 
contract elapsing before start is similar in terms of program completion time and alternative 
hypothesis	ܪଵ: ߤ௕௔௦௘ ് ߤ௜೟೓% if there is significant difference.  
 Summary of t-Test Results of SE Activity Start Time Adjustments With 
Original KPP’s Process Time 
 % of Contract Elapsed Before Start 
75% 
(Baseline) 
50% 33% 25% 
Average Time to MS B 
(Days) 
3418.01 3379.09 3379.09 3379.09 
Standard Deviation (Days) 1701.08 1670.31 1670.31 1670.31 
P-Value  0.770 0.770 0.770 
Conclusion  Fail to Reject 
H0 
Fail to Reject 
H0 
Fail to Reject 
H0 
 
 Summary of t-Test Results of SE Activity Start Time Adjustments With 
Reduced KPP’s Process Time 
 % of Contract Elapsed Before Start 
75% 
(Baseline) 
65% 60% 55% 
Average Time to MS B 
(Days) 
3418.01 3305.44 3200.75 3139.95 
Standard Deviation (Days) 1701.08 1628.08 1599.04 1553.38 
P-Value  0.392 0.099 0.032 
Conclusion  Fail to Reject 
H0 
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As seen in Table 6, it is evident that the time to MS B is not sensitive to an earlier 
start time for SE activities when the KPP process time is set to the default distribution. In 
fact, when the start time is at 50%, 33%, and 25% of the contract time, the time to MS B, 
standard deviation of time to MS B, and p-value are identical. This is due to the hold module 
in the SE path described earlier. As previously discussed, in order for the SE activities to 
begin, a percent of the contract must elapse and the KPPs must be complete. Once the SE 
activities start time occurs earlier than 50% of the contract length, the KPPs completion is 
the determining factor of the SE activity start time.  
Table 7 takes this into account by reducing the KPPs’ process time to a point where 
it does not dictate the start of the SE activities. As seen in Table 7, it is evident that when SE 
activities begin at 60% of the contract length or later, there will not be a statistically 
significant decrease in the time to MS B. However, when SE activities begin at 55% of the 
contract length or sooner and the KPPs’ generation processes are shortened to the same 
degree, the model exhibits a statistically significant decrease in time to MS B. 
Conclusions 
The critical path analysis performed in this research indicated that the SE activities 
and their communication with the requirements branch are the bottleneck of the Pre-MS B 
portion of the acquisition system. In addition, the research indicated that focusing on reforms 
that address this bottleneck has the potential to decrease the total time spent on MS B 
activities by approximately 7%; this corresponds to a process time reduction of 
approximately six months.  
This research also tested two strategies to address this bottleneck. The first was 
reducing the process time of all SE activities. The second was to allow the SE activities to 
have an earlier start time. This research showed that the latter policy has the potential to be 
the most beneficial. This research showed that the process times for all SE activities must 
be decreased by approximately 50% in order for a statistically significant decrease in time to 
MS B to occur. This degree of process time reduction may be infeasible. On the other hand, 
allowing the SE activities to occur after 55% of the contract time has elapsed rather than the 
current 75% produces a statistically significant decrease in time to MS B.  
The increased sensitivity of program time to start time, rather than process length, 
suggests that schedule benefits may be achieved if the some resources, both financial and 
human, are transferred from the SE activities to the activities prior to test and development. 
However, this re-allocation of resources must be accompanied by responsiveness from the 
JCIDS branch, which is the branch that generates the KPPs. This research indicates that 
there was a large amount of co-dependence between the JCIDS and SE activities and that 
communication and coordination between these branches is needed in order to address the 
bottleneck. 
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